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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1398 
_____________ 
  
THOMAS K. VAUGHAN, JR., 
     Appellant 
      
v. 
  
THE BOEING COMPANY 
         
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-15-cv-04845) 
District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 15, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, RESTREPO, FISHER Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: May 22, 2018) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas Vaughan, Jr. appeals from an order of the District 
Court granting summary judgment to his former employer, The Boeing Company, on his 
federal and state law claims of race discrimination and retaliation. We will affirm.  
I1 
 As the District Court aptly remarked, this case presents an unfortunate situation: 
the falling out between a long-time employee and his employer. In 2013, after eighteen 
years of working at Boeing, Vaughan was fired from his position as a composite 
fabricator due to an altercation with a shift manager. However, Vaughan was able to 
negotiate his return pursuant to a Reinstatement and Last Chance Agreement entered into 
by Vaughan, his union, and Boeing. The Last Chance Agreement required Vaughan to 
meet regularly with an Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) counselor, Richard 
Buxton, who worked on-site at Boeing but was employed by a third-party counseling 
agency.2 This agreement also put Vaughan “on notice that any incident, considered to be 
insubordination, either direct or indirect, [would] result in his immediate discharge.” JA 
140.  
 Upon Vaughan’s return to Boeing, he was moved from the department where he 
had worked for the previous six years and the task with which he was familiar—
                                              
1  Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the facts 
necessary to this opinion. 
 
2  The conversations between employees and any third-party EAP counselors are 
confidential, and counselors may only break that confidentiality in extreme circumstances 
or if given permission by the employee.  
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“deflash,” or the grinding down of airplane parts to ensure smoothness. Instead, Vaughan 
was assigned to a new task in a new department with a new supervisor. Specifically, 
Vaughan was assigned to perform “bonding,” or attaching component parts to aircrafts, in 
the V-22 Osprey Department (“V-22 Department”) under the direction of Charles Moyer, 
a white supervisor. Out of approximately twenty to twenty-five employees, Vaughan was 
the only black composite fabricator in Moyer’s bonding operation in the V-22 
Department.  
Initially, Vaughan was tasked with sweeping the floor, rather than with substantive 
bonding work. After several weeks of being constrained to sweeping work, Vaughan 
expressed his frustration to Moyer. Vaughan also conveyed his concern to Buxton that he 
was spending an unusual amount of time sweeping and still had not been given 
substantive work. Vaughan gave Buxton permission to relay this concern to the employee 
relations department, which Buxton did. Within a week of Buxton’s notice to employee 
relations, Vaughan was finally given “meaningful work[.]” JA 147. 
Once performing his primary task in bonding—attaching fuel bag hangers to 
airplane fuel tanks—Vaughan felt that he was not receiving enough hands-on training, 
and he relayed this concern to Buxton. Vaughan also expressed this training concern to 
Moyer on several occasions. On one such occasion, Moyer responded to Vaughan’s 
request for training by asking “if [he] was an idiot.” JA 90. Vaughan notified Buxton of 
Moyer’s unprofessional and unfortunate insult, who in turn relayed the comment to 
Vaughan’s union. In response, Boeing transferred Vaughan the next day to a different 
supervisor in the same V-22 Department, Mark Muldowney, who was white. Following 
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this transfer, Vaughan reported to Buxton that he was “more optimistic” in the new 
arrangement, now that he was performing substantive work. JA 147. 
At the same time, Vaughan consistently experienced difficulty following Boeing’s 
safety protocol regarding Foreign Object Debris (“FOD”), or items foreign to the aircraft 
under construction. To prevent stray tools in particular from being left behind in a 
worksite, Boeing employs a “chit” system in order to regulate the checking out of tools 
from any toolbox. Under this system, employees must leave a chit—or piece of plastic 
marked with an employee identification number—in place of a tool while it is in use. 
Once no longer in use, employees must return the tool to the box and retrieve the 
placeholder chit. Employees are required to remove all tools and FOD from the worksite 
every time they leave the worksite, no matter how short the break. At the end of their 
shifts, employees are required to return all tools to the toolbox and account for all chits. If 
any tool or chit is missing, employees are required to notify a manager, and the factory is 
shut down until the tool or chit is located. Because of the seriousness of the FOD safety 
protocol, all composite fabricators are required to undergo an annual FOD training. 
Vaughan had taken the annual FOD training.  
 Shortly after beginning substantive work, Muldowney noticed that Vaughan left 
FOD on an aircraft while on break. Because Vaughan was new to the V-22 Department 
and stated he was “unaware of the processes” in that operation, Muldowney briefed 
Vaughan about the issue and provided an informal coaching session on FOD control. JA 
334. Muldowney informed Vaughan that, pursuant to Boeing’s discipline policy, future 
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violations could result in corrective action, which typically entailed the involvement of 
human resources (“HR”) and the issuance of a written warning.  
One week later, Vaughan left out several tools on a cart overnight and Muldowney 
emailed the HR representative for the V-22 Department about both this infraction and the 
previous incident. Because it was not Vaughan’s first infraction, Muldowney requested 
that HR issue Vaughan a written warning. Shortly thereafter, while an HR investigation 
and decision on the overnight FOD incident was pending, Muldowney observed that 
Vaughan left paper backing on an aircraft. Two days later, Vaughan checked out a sander 
from a toolbox without placing a chit in its place. Vaughan was ultimately given a written 
warning and a three-day suspension in light of his four FOD infractions.  
Following his suspension and return to work, Vaughan worked overtime without 
prior approval. Earlier on the same day of this violation, Muldowney had discussed the 
overtime workplace policy with his employees, including Vaughan. Muldowney notified 
HR and requested that Vaughan be disciplined for this infraction. While that decision was 
pending, Donald Clayton, a black manager from another operation, notified Muldowney 
that he saw an orbital sander left overnight in a cart in the bonders’ work area and that 
one of Vaughan’s chits was in the sander’s place. Muldowney reported this final incident 
to HR, recommending that Vaughan be fired. Vaughan disputes the sixth and final 
infraction—he maintains that he did not leave the orbital sander out, as stated by 
Clayton.3  
                                              
3  Because Vaughan disputes that the sixth and final violation took place, the Court 
construes the facts in Vaughan’s favor, as it must at this stage, and considers only his first 
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On January 27, 2014, less than four months after Vaughan’s return, Boeing 
terminated Vaughan citing his unauthorized overtime and FOD infractions. Although 
Vaughan offers explanations for them, he does not dispute that the first five infractions—
four FOD and one overtime—occurred.  
Vaughan filed this action against Boeing asserting claims of race discrimination 
and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 951–63. The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Boeing on all claims. Vaughan timely appeals. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment. Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2013). 
Therefore, we apply the same standard as the district court. Id. Summary judgment is 
appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; do not engage in 
                                              
five infractions. Moreover, to the extent that a jury’s consideration of the disputed 
infraction would not impact the outcome, this dispute is not one of material fact sufficient 
to preclude summary judgment. See Hampton v. Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dep’t, 
98 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he non-moving party must demonstrate a dispute 
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit.”); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 
766–67 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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credibility determinations; and draw all inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Mandel, 
706 F.3d at 164. If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial,” then there can be no genuine issue of material fact and 
we will affirm a District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 
III 
All claims of race discrimination brought under Title VII, § 1981, or the PHRA 
are governed by the “familiar burden-shifting framework” set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).4 Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 
(3d Cir. 1999). Under this framework, a plaintiff first “carr[ies] the initial burden . . . of 
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). In 
order to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination, “[a] plaintiff must show that: 1) 
[he] is a member of a protected class, 2) [he] was qualified for the position [he] sought to 
attain or retain, 3) [he] suffered an adverse employment action, and 4) the action occurred 
                                              
4  We have previously held that “the substantive elements of a claim under section 
1981 are generally identical to the elements of an employment discrimination claim under 
Title VII.” Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009). The same is true 
for claims brought pursuant to the PHRA. Atkinson v. LaFayette College, 460 F.3d 447, 
454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title 
VII claims[.]”). Accordingly, we evaluate Vaughan’s several race discrimination claims 
simultaneously. 
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under circumstances that could give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” 
Mandel, 706 F.3d at 169 (quoting Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
If a plaintiff is able to set out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then 
“shift[s] to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, if the employer 
articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer’s “stated reason . . . was in fact pretext.” Id. at 804.  
A plaintiff can defeat summary judgment by demonstrating pretext in one of two 
ways: 1) by “point[ing] to evidence in the record that would cause a reasonable juror to 
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reason, thereby 
creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to the credibility of that reason[,]” Burton v. 
Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762), or 
2) “pointing to evidence that indicates that the employer acted with discriminatory 
animus[,]” id. If proceeding by the first method, a plaintiff need not provide evidence that 
the employer acted with animus, but rather only that the employer’s rationale is 
“unworthy of credence[.]” Id. (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 
F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [he] 
engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment 
action against [him], and (3) there was a causal connection between [his] participation in 
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore v. City of Phila., 461 
F.3d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 2006). “[A]t the prima facie stage, a plaintiff need only proffer 
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evidence sufficient to raise the inference that [his] engagement in a protected activity was 
the likely reason for the adverse employment action[.]” Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State 
Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 253 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original). 
IV 
A 
Boeing does not dispute that Vaughan has met the first three elements of a prima 
facie case of race discrimination. Therefore, the only question remaining for Vaughan to 
establish a prima facie claim is whether the circumstances surrounding his termination 
give rise to an inference of race discrimination. The District Court reasonably found the 
question a close one, and ultimately decided Vaughan narrowly made a showing 
supporting a discriminatory inference. But, even if we presume Vaughan has made such a 
showing and has, therefore, stated a prima facie case of race discrimination, Vaughan’s 
claim would nonetheless fail at the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework: 
pretext.  
At the first step, we assume arguendo that Vaughan has set forth a prima facie 
claim. At the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Boeing has articulated a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for Vaughan’s termination: Vaughan’s many 
FOD infractions and his overtime violation. At the third step, Vaughan has not overcome 
that rationale by pointing to evidence that would either undermine the credibility of 
Boeing’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him or suggest that 
Boeing acted with discriminatory animus. Burton, 707 F.3d at 430–31. 
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First, there is no basis to “disbelieve [Boeing’s] articulated legitimate reasons[.]” 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). Vaughan contends that there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact on this point because, in his view, Boeing fired him solely 
because of the final, disputed FOD incident. But Vaughan’s FOD infractions were 
numerous and, with the exception of one, undisputed by Vaughan. The corrective action 
memorandum recommending termination recognizes this, noting that Vaughan “ha[d] 
been provided numerous coaching sessions and trainings for similar [FOD] incidents[.]” 
JA 259. Moreover, the termination memo cites to Vaughan’s “work[ing] unauthorized 
post-shift overtime despite verbal instructions not to do so[.]” Id. Unfortunately for 
Vaughan, he was on tenuous ground at the time of this infraction. Acting contrary to 
Muldowney’s overtime instructions on the same day they were given could be construed 
as “insubordination, either direct or indirect” sufficient to trigger immediate discharge 
under the Last Chance Agreement. JA 140. This undisputed evidence regarding the 
overtime violation precludes us from finding Boeing’s stated reason for Vaughn’s 
termination unworthy of credence. 
 Second, Vaughan has not “point[ed] to evidence that indicates that the employer 
acted with discriminatory animus.” Burton, 707 F.3d at 430–31. Vaughan offers as 
comparators the names of white employees who he posits had violated FOD and overtime 
requirements without repercussions. But even accepting, as we must at summary 
judgment, Vaughan’s testimony that some of his white co-workers were committing 
FODs or performing unauthorized overtime without repercussions, neither Vaughan’s 
testimony nor the balance of the evidence suggests that those employees were similarly-
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situated and therefore proper comparators. For example, he has not shown that each of 
the identified white employees committed multiple violations with impunity. Moreover, 
Vaughan was an employee on a “Last Chance.” Vaughan has not indicated whether the 
other white bonding employees were on similar probationary status. Thus, Vaughan has 
not provided adequate comparator evidence. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of 
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The plaintiff has the burden of 
demonstrating that similarly situated persons were treated differently.” (citing Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 258)).  
Because Vaughan has not provided reason to disbelieve Boeing or find racially 
discriminatory animus in his termination, he has failed to meet his burden to show pretext 
under McDonnell Douglas.  
B 
 Finally, Vaughan has failed to state a prima facie claim of retaliation. For the 
purposes of this motion, the parties agree that Vaughan engaged in protected activity. We 
accept, as we must at summary judgment, Vaughan’s contention that the protected 
activity at issue is his communication to Buxton that he believed he was being treated 
unfairly because of his race. The parties also agree that he suffered adverse employment 
action. Therefore, only the third element is in dispute—that a causal connection existed 
between the first and second elements.  
The Court agrees with the District Court that Vaughan has failed to establish such 
a causal connection. In order “for protected conduct to be a . . . factor in a decision, the 
decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct.” See Ambrose v. Township of 
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Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002). Without such awareness, the causal chain is 
broken.  
Vaughan has presented evidence that Buxton communicated Vaughan’s concern 
that he “was spending an unusual amount of time sweeping the floor” to Boeing’s 
employee relations department. JA 147. But Vaughan has not presented any evidence that 
Boeing was made aware or had knowledge of the component of Vaughan’s 
communication which would be protected—that race discrimination may be at the root of 
his sweeping concern. Though Buxton testified that he privately believed Vaughan may 
have been tasked to sweep for so long due to discrimination, Buxton also testified that he 
kept that belief private from both Vaughan and from Boeing. Buxton further testified 
that, because his communications with Vaughan were confidential, he only conveyed to 
Boeing the portion of their conversation that Vaughan permitted Buxton to relay—that 
Vaughan was given “excessive[]” sweeping duties and was concerned that he had not 
performed substantive work since his return to Boeing. Id. Buxton did not frame 
Vaughan’s sweeping concern as one of race discrimination when conveying it to Boeing.  
Vaughan does not dispute Buxton’s testimony, but instead argues that this Court 
should nonetheless make the inference that the employee relations department, 
Muldowney, and other supervisors nonetheless knew of the discriminatory nature of 
Vaughan’s complaint. But, as the District Court reasonably noted, this request goes too 
far. At summary judgment, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to Vaughan 
only to the extent that there is a genuine dispute as to those facts. Scott v. Harris, 550 
U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Similarly, we must only draw all reasonable inferences in 
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Vaughan’s favor “to the extent supportable by the record.” Id. at 381 n.8. To assume that 
Boeing knew Vaughan engaged in protected activity where the record suggests otherwise 
would be an unreasonable inference that we cannot make. Vaughan has, therefore, failed 
to show his protected activity was a factor in Boeing’s decision. Without a showing of 
causation, Vaughan has failed to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. 
V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
